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I. INTRODUCTION

Spring has returned to the West once again. The carpet of natural
grass and desert foliage has turned green as vegetation blooms across
the varied landscape. Runoff from mountain snow rises in the rivers,
and for farmers, irrigation season has begun. In California and across
the West, the risk of conflict grows between those who divert water and
those who defend the water needs of fish. Fish need water in the
streams to survive-the same water humans divert out of the stream for
t J.D. 1988, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. During
the early stages of the conflict discussed in this article, the author represented the City
of Los Angeles on the Board of Directors of Metropolitan Water District of Southern

California. Since 1997, he has worked for the United States Department of the
Interior. This article reflects the author's personal perspective, not the views of the
United States Department of the Interior.
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consumptive uses. Many of today's western water conflicts are sparked
by the listing of threatened or endangered fish species under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Once listed, those responsible for its
survival work intensely, often in the face of challenges from the
consumptive users, to bring it back from the brink of extinction. From
salmon in the Columbia River to the silvery minnow in the Rio
Grande, stakeholders and government agencies confront the conflicts
that accompany the listing of an endangered species of fish.
After a decade of conflict, however, California has initiated a series
of projects reflecting a more cooperative approach, under the banner
of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program! Among these projects, the
Environmental Water Account ("CALFED EWA") offers one of the
most important tools for healing relationships between the ecosystem
and the water stakeholder community in a time of farmer/fish
conflicts.
In addressing its ESA water issues in the last decade, California has
used a combination of regulation and water acquisitions to provide the
water that its listed fish species need to avoid jeopardy and move
toward recovery. In the early 1990s, when California confronted
conflicts arising out of ESA listings and the state experienced its worst
drought in history, its multitude of water stakeholders joined with state
and federal governments to find a way out of the quagmire. A 1994
accord on water quality regulation provided time to craft a long-term
solution for the state's water flashpoint; the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta ("Delta").
At that time, the
governments and stakeholders shared a common goal: recovery of
listed species. Because of the government mandate to protect listed
species, water users needed to find a solution that not only recognized
their long-term interests in a reliable water supply, but also stabilized
and restored important fish species that had suffered dramatic
declines. The solution was to establish an environmental water
account that would set aside water for fishery needs. Thus, the
CALFED EWA was born.2
The CALFED EWA creates a water supply for fishery needs without
relying on regulatory edicts. Instead, its operators in state and federal
agencies acquire water for the environment from existing water right
holders or from maximizing the use of water project facilities. With
this water supply at their disposal, state and federal water project
operators can make timely, critical adjustments in operations to make
1. The term "CALFED" originated from the combination of the state (CAL) and
federal (FED) governments working together to resolve the environmental and water
management conflicts in the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta.
2. See CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC REcORD OF DECISION 54-58
(2000) [hereinafter CALFED ROD]. The reader may access the Record of Decision at
http://www.calfed.water.ca.gov. The Record of Decision establishes a comprehensive
ecosystem recovery and water management program of which the CALFED EWA isjust
one part. The CALFED EWA, however, required the most attention from the federal
and state government CALFED negotiators. This article will use the term "CALFED
EWA" to refer specifically to the CALFED account.
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water available to fulfill the needs of listed species and project
contractors while preventing reductions in deliveries due to such
adjustments. These adjustments either use the CALFED EWA's assets
directly for reservoir releases and instream demands, or indirectly to
compensate project water users for reductions in project diversions.
While the CALFED EWA developed over a two-year period, its origins
date back more than a decade to the 1990 listing of winter-run salmon
as threatened pursuant to the ESA, and the conflict that followed.
That conflict forged some of the ingredients necessary for the
CALFED EWA, including the research and identification of the water
needs of listed species and a consensus on a regulatory baseline of
protection necessary to stabilize fishery populations.
The lessons that California has learned in creating and
implementing the CALFED EWA may provide insight for water
stakeholders in other watersheds. An environmental water account
offers a more efficient and effective method of drawing together
conflicting stakeholders to work toward recovery. It creates and uses a
water budget with maximum flexibility for restoring an entire aquatic
ecosystem rather than prescribing standards that restrict water project
operations for the benefit of a particular listed species.
An
environmental water account can lead toward recovery with minimal
water losses to consumptive water users, or at least compensation for
any such losses.
The California experience shows how an
environmental water account can contribute to conflict resolution, the
elements required to create an account, and the challenges that
account managers face in implementing an environmental water
account. The CALFED EWA does not resolve all difficulties and
conflicts. Instead, it offers an essential tool for addressing those
conflicts.
The CALFED EWA is a framework for continued
cooperation in helping the watershed's fishery recover.
H. WHY AN ENVIRONMENTAL WATER ACCOUNT IN
CALIFORNIA?
In moving from the jeopardy avoidance stage to the start of
recovery with the CALFED EWA, California spent a decade in varying
degrees of conflict between the water needs of the fish and the needs
of consumptive users. The stages of that conflict were not too
different from conflicts in other watersheds where excessive diversions
had brought species to the brink of extinction. As in other watersheds,
at each stage, the federal and state governments in California worked
with the watershed's stakeholders to resolve the immediate conflict
and the particular needs of the Central Valley watershed. The
CALFED EWA's development in the later stages of the conflict
reflected a concerted effort to address the long-term needs for fishery
recovery.
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A. BACKGROUND
The CALFED EWA arose out of a conflict in California's
Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, which flows into the San
Francisco Bay. The Delta serves-both figuratively and literally-as the
heart valves for the state's north-south water conveyance system and
the most valuable estuary ecosystem on the West Coast. Water from
upstream reservoirs on the Sacramento River and its tributaries flows
into the Delta to mix with flows from several other river systems and
out to the San Francisco Bay. At the Delta's south end, large federal
and state pumping facilities take water south to San Joaquin Valley
farms and southern California cities. At the same time, the Delta's
unique mix of waters-both fresh and salt-creates a rich estuary
ecosystem for fish and wildlife. These competing demands for the
Delta's waters led to conflict, which led to the CALFED EWA.
The roots of the Delta water conflict can be traced back to the
earliest days of diversions in the Sacramento Valley.' The more recent
legal conflict over regulation for fishery needs dates back to 1978,
when the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") adopted a
water quality control plan for the Delta ("1978 Plan") and an
accompanying water rights decision ("D-1485").
D-1485 imposed
conditions on the permits for federal and state water projects that
pumped water from the Delta.'
The state and federal agencies
operating the water projects, as well as several other parties,
challenged the 1978 Plan and D-1485 because they restricted project
operations in order to protect fish. Those challenges resulted in a
landmark California court decision rejecting the 1978 Plan and D-1485
because they did not adequately address fishery needs and consider
water right permits throughout the watershed.5 The SWRCB issued a
new draft water quality control plan and decision in December1992, in
the midst of California's worst drought and after Delta fishery
conditions had changed dramatically with the listings of certain
salmon species in the Central Valley. At the Governor's request, the
SWRCB withdrew the draft decision, deferring to federal regulation
under the ESA.6
In the early 1990s, several events changed the nature of water and
ecosystem management in the Delta. First, the Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (collectively "ESA
Agencies") listed as threatened certain fish species that lived in or

3. See Town of Antioch v. Williams Irrigation Dist., 205 P. 688, 689 (Cal. 1922)
(conflict over saltwater intrusion into the Delta due to upstream diversions).

4. In re Permit 12720, Decision No. 1485, 1978 Cal. ENV LEXIS 41 (Aug. 16,
1978).
5. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986). See
also Alf W. Brandt, United States v. State Water Resources Control Board: A Comprehensive
Approach To Water Policy In California,14 ECOLOGYL.Q. 713 (1988).

6. Phase of the Bay-Delta Estuary Proceedings, Apr. 22, 1993 [hereinafter SWRCB
Order No. 90-5].
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passed through the Delta
Adding listed species to the system
required the Federal Central Valley Project ("CVP") to consult with
the ESA Agencies as to how to avoid jeopardizing survival of the listed
species.
Initially, the CVP was required to maintain cooler
temperatures in the Sacramento River to support salmon spawning.8
In 1991, the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
disapproved the state's 1978 Delta water quality standards as not
meeting the requirements of the Clean Water Act, which ultimately led
environmentalists to sue to require the EPA to promulgate federal
water quality standards.9 Second, in 1992, the "take" of listed salmon
at the Delta pumps led to temporary pumping reductions at both CVP
and State Water Project ("SWP") facilities, whose close coordination
was required by statute and allowed for ESA coverage of the state's
pumping.
Finally, in 1992, President Bush signed legislation that
added fish and wildlife protection as one of the CVP's authorized
purposes and dedicated 800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield to fish
restoration purposes."
The environmentalists' lawsuit against the EPA provided the lever
to force resolution of the immediate conflict over Delta water quality
standards for fishery needs. The resulting consent decree required the
EPA to promulgate federal water quality standards for the Delta by
December 15, 1994.2 All of the federal and state agencies involved in
the Delta agreed to work together in addressing the Delta's needs.' s
Those agencies then engaged the Delta's stakeholders in negotiating
new standards, ultimately agreeing to the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord
("Accord") in compliance with the December 15 deadline." The
Accord provided for close coordination of the state and federal water
projects in complying with new water quality standards and fulfilling
Delta fishery needs for an interim period of three years. 5 Those three
years were intended to provide time for state and federal agencies to
7. Listing of the Sacramento River Winter-run Chinook salmon, 55 Fed. Reg.
49,623 (Nov. 30, 1990) [hereinafter Chinook Listing]; Fish and Wildlife Service Delta
Smelt Listing, 58 Fed. Reg. 12,863 (Mar. 5, 1993).
8. See SWRCB Order No. 90-5, supra note 6.
9. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. Browner, No. 93-646-LKK (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(consent decree requiring EPA promulgation pursuant to the Clean Water Act) (on
file with author).
10. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
11. Amendments to Central Valley Project Authorizations, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §
3406(b) (2), 106 Stat. 4714.
12. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y, No. 93-646-LKK.
13. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNOR'S WATER POLICY COUNCIL OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE FEDERAL EcosYSTEM DIRCTORATE 1-2 (1994) [hereinafter
FRAMEWORKAGREEMENT) (on file with author).
14. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ET AL., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE STATE OF CAIFORNIA FOR COORDINATED OPERATION
OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT AND THE STATE WATER PROJECT (1994) [hereinafter

BAY-DELTAACCoRD]. See also Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-DeltaAccord: A Stride Toward
Sustainability,67 U. COLO. L. REv. 341(1996).
15.

BAY-DELTAACCORD, supranote 14.
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work with urban, agricultural and environmental stakeholders to craft
long-term Delta solutions. 6
Those long-term solutions developed into the CALFED Bay-Delta
Program, a cooperative program of twenty-one state and federal
agencies with responsibilities in the Bay-Delta and its watershed.
CALFED addresses four primary concerns for the Delta: ecosystem
restoration, water management (including storage and conveyance),
water quality, and levee system integrity.7
As the conflicts developed, the Department of the Interior began
implementing the Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA").
In addition to shifting 800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield to environmental
purposes, the CVPIA also required re-operation of the federal project
to protect anadromous fish, so long as the re-operation did not affect
deliveries to CVP contractors." Additionally, the CVPIA required the
Secretary of the Interior to develop a plan for increasing Project yield
to replace the 800,000 acre-feet dedicated to environmental
purposes." These and many other CVPIA requirements shifted the
attention of CVP operators to a broader range of Project purposes.
B. SHORT HISTORY OF CALFED EWA

As the CALFED agencies worked with stakeholders during the fall
of 1998, the ESA Agencies proposed additional periods of reduced
project pumping to protect and promote the recovery of listed fish
species.2 Shortly thereafter, agencies and stakeholders working with
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and the governor's chief of staff
proposed establishing a collection of water assets to satisfy the needs of
the Delta's fish.2
With preliminary support from the state and federal governments
in December 1998, agencies and stakeholders began to study and
pursue development of the CALFED EWA. Michael J. Spear of the
Fish and Wildlife Service and Timothy Quinn, representing the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, led the discussions
with a small group of stakeholders, biologists, and water project
16. I&
17. CALFED ROD, supra note 2.
18. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Central Valley Project
Improvement Act, available at http://www.mp.usbr.gov/cvpia/index.html, required the
Secretary "to modify Central Valley Project operations to provide flows of suitable
quality, quantity, and timing to protect all life stages of anadromous fish... from
other sources which do not conflict with fulfillment of the Secretary's remaining
contractual obligations to provide Central Valley Project water for other authorized
purposes."
19. Id.
20. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, REVISED PHASE II REPORT 38-39 (1998)
[hereinafter
12/98
PHASE
II
REPORT],
available
at
http://calfed.water.ca.gov/historical/phase2/chapter2/chapter2.html.
21. The formal EWA proposals developed during stakeholder meetings hosted by
Secretary Babbitt during the fall of 1998. Secretary Babbitt and California Governor
Pete Wilson's Chief of Staff decided to pursue an EWA at stakeholder meetings at the
Los Angeles Airport Hilton during the first week of December 1998.
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modelers."
The group considered several possible structures,
including a water project contractor for the environment, an
environmental water credit account within each water project, and an
independent environmental water broker, ultimately studying a range
of CALFED EWA designs to determine what worked best for the Delta
and those who rely on the Delta.2 3 After this small group completed
their analysis, the CALFED agencies convened in the fall of 1999 with
another group of senior agency and stakeholder representatives to
negotiate the CALFED EWA and other CALFED programs. Despite
intense debate among stakeholders, those discussions failed to achieve
consensus on the terms for creating the CALFED EWA.
In 1999, as agencies and stakeholders began developing how the
CALFED EWA might work, new crises arose where the state and
federal export projects were required to make operational adjustments
and/or reduce pumping from the Delta pursuant to the Delta Water
Quality Control Plan or the ESA.25 While there was some discussion of
creating an EWA pilot project for the 1999 water year, the ESA
Agencies determined that too many issues required resolution before
an EWA could be demonstrated effectively-from how to account for
26
use of the environmental water to what assets the fish needed most.
The 1999 operational adjustments, however, made the creation of an
environmental water account that much more urgent, particularly for
the water user stakeholders.
The water users who were dependent on the two water projects
objected to the 1999 operational adjustments because of the risk of
lower project water deliveries. They believed that the creation of a
water account for the environment would provide the water needed to
"make up" for the reduced deliveries they had experienced due to
fishery needs.
The water users therefore advocated immediate
acquisition of water for the environment to replace their losses.
Proposed acquisitions included existing groundwater from actively
22.

CALFED BAY-DELTA

[hereinafter

6/99

PROGRAM,

PHASE

REVISED PHASE II REPORT 98-99
II

REPORT],

available

(1999)
at

http://calfed.water.ca.gov/historical/phase2/chapter2/chapter2.html.
23. 12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 115.
24. CALFED, Water Management Development Team ("WMDT") Report
(contained in 12/99 CALFED Policy Group Agenda Package) (on file with author).
Compare Letter from Ag/Urban WMDT Members, to The Honorable Gray Davis,
Governor of California and The Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of Interior (Nov.
5, 1999), with Letter from Environmental Water Caucus, to Mike Spear, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and Steve Macaulay, Department of Water Resources (Nov. 15, 1999)
(all on file with author).
25. In May 1999, the Delta pumping facilities exceeded their take limit for delta
smelt and responded by reducing the level of pumping to 3500 cfs. In November
1999, salmon began migrating down the Sacramento River and the Delta CrossChannel was closed to prevent salmon from being drawn into the central Delta. The
Delta Cross-Channel was designed to improve water quality in the central Delta and
near the export pumps. Due to a dry fall, the closure led to water quality degradation
at the pumps and pumping was again reduced.
26. 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 22, at 98-101.
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managed groundwater basins (recently refilled by several wet years),
drainage water, and water from other non-project storage facilities."
Stakeholder pressure during early 2000, including a state legislature
hearing on the 1999 reductions, encouraged the federal and state
administrations to proceed with final negotiations for the CALFED
Bay-Delta Program, with particular emphasis on the EWA.
C. THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL WATER AccouNTs

The premise behind an environmental water account is that it
provides an efficient and flexible mechanism to acquire and use water
assets to adjust water project operations in response to changing
hydrology and fishery needs.Y An environmental water account allows
maximum flexibility to respond to the changing needs of the fishery
and the ecosystem as a whole, working better than fixed prescriptive
standards that restrict water project operations for the benefit of
several particular listed species.
Such an account can share the
benefits of wet hydrology and new facilities, allowing both the
ecosystem and water users to enjoy improved conditions.1
The key aspects of the CALFED EWA operation include water asset
development and use for fishery needs, or in other words, deposits and
withdrawals. The CALFED EWA starts with a baseline of regulatory
protection for listed species. This baseline serves as both an initial cap
on project yield reductions arising out of regulatory decisions, and
from an accounting perspective, the "zero point" for tracking deposits
and withdrawals from the account. The EWA grows by water
acquisitions and "reoperation" of project facilities. Reoperation is the
use of excess project pumping or storage capacity and increased
project yield arising out of operational adjustments during periods
when listed species are not at risk. 2
Such project reoperation for the EWA arises out of the unique
attributes of the Delta system. For example, a key asset is the EWA's
access to "joint point of diversion," where the state and federal water
projects may use each other's Delta pumping facilities. This asset
particularly benefits the federal CVP because its smaller pumping
capacity (4,600 cfs compared to the state's 10,000 cfs) makes it more
27. See, e.g., DRAFr WATER PURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN KERN COUNTY WATER
BANK AuTHORrlY AND UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1999) [hereinafter
KERN AGREEMENT] (on file with author).

28. Testimony of Lester A. Snow, Regional Director, Mid-Pacific Region, Bureau of
Reclamation, at a Joint Hearing, Senate Agriculture and Water Committee and
Assembly Water, Parks and Wildlife Committee, Feb. 1, 2000 (on file with author).
29. 12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 115; 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note
22, at 95.
30. 12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 115; 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note
22, at 96.
31.

12/98 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 20, at 115-20; 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra

note 22, at 95-101.
32. This paragraph reflects a summary of the Environmental Water Account
Operating Principles Agreement [hereinafter EWA Op. Prins.], which is Attachment 2
to the CALFED ROD, supra note 2.
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difficult to fill its share of the San Luis Reservoir, south of the Delta,
which the two projects operate jointly. The State Water Project
("SWP") can therefore increase CVP yield by pumping CVP water after
it fills its share of San Luis Reservoir. At other times, however, the
SWP can benefit when listed fish congregate near its Delta intake,
requiring reduced SWP pumping to limit "take." In such situations,
the CVP can pump water for the SWP. The EWA gets credit for 50
percent of the CVP benefits from "joint point," increasing its deposits.
Another reoperation example is the ESA Agencies' discretion to allow
increased pumping during certain periods when listed fish are not
near the pumps and therefore not at risk. Still another EWA asset is
"borrowing," where pumping may be reduced in one year without
affecting that year's deliveries, and if the following winter is wet
enough, the water debt may be repaid by increased pumping during
periods of high Delta outflow.3
The CALFED EWA's assets can be used directly for either instrean
water needs or indirectly to compensate water project users for
reduced diversions that result in reduced water deliveries. Additional
releases out of upstream reservoirs or reduced diversions upstream
from the Delta may supplement instream water flows. Alternatively,
EWA managers may call for reduced state and federal water project
pumping in the Delta to reduce take at the pumps or to support
anadromous fish migration to the ocean. Although the EWA generally
promotes recovery of listed species, its assets may be used for any
reason that supports the fishery, including reducing take to prevent
incidental take limits from being exceeded. The
assets therefore may
34
help avoid jeopardy as well as support recovery.
While California water users have focused on compensation for
water "lost" to the environment, the CALFED EWA is more than a
mere mechanism to acquire water for "makeup" to water users for
environmental actions. Its intent is to maximize project efficiency and
flexibility, allowing the projects to provide both fish and water users
with reliable water supplies. Setting seasonal pumping restrictions by
biological opinion under the ESA generally does not allow for a
response to constantly changing hydrologic and fishery conditions.
Only when project operations exceed ESA take limits do the fishery
agencies seek additional pumping reductions, and, at that point, the
reductions are often substantial, and are too late to prevent the excess
take. With an EWA as collateral, the fishery agencies can call for early
and moderate pumping reductions that minimize both the take of
listed species and the need for subsequent, substantial pumping
reductions.35 In some cases, subsequent hydrology may allow project
33. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 54-58; EWA Op. Prins., supranote 32.
34. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 54-58; EWA Op. Prins., supranote 32.
35. Although the EWA had not been created yet, the water projects and ESA
Agencies agreed to reduce pumping in the early spring of 2000, which helped delta
smelt to pass the project pumps early and avoided a substantial violation of take limits
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contractors to avoid any delivery reductions resulting from the
pumping reductions. In other cases, avoiding delivery reductions may
require drawing down the EWA.

M. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CALFED EWA
Although the final negotiations to create the CALFED EWA did
not last much longer than six months, the roots of its development
date back a decade. In order to achieve the consensus support for the
EWA, federal and state governments and the stakeholders needed to
resolve several issues, including identifying the biological needs of fish,
resolving initial conflicts, building a stable state-federal relationship,
and establishing a regulatory baseline. At that point, the key agencies
and stakeholders could turn their attention to creating an EWA to
serve the peculiar needs of the Bay-Delta watershed.
A. CONFLICT/COMPETITION
The need for the CALFED EWA did not arise until conflict ensued
when fishery water requirements reached a critical point in the 1990s.
Populations of salmon and delta smelt had declined precipitously,
particularly during the drought of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
ESA Agencies listed those fish and focused their efforts on drawing the
species back from the brink of extinction. 6
Initially, salmon
protection efforts focused on maintaining cool temperatures in the
Sacramento River and minimizing take by upstream diversions.37 The
CVP and SWP did not reduce pumping from the Delta due to
excessive take until 1992, two years after listing the winter-run
salmon. 38 At that point, the perilous condition of the fish allowed the

ESA Agencies to use the ESA's powerful regulatory tools to take drastic
steps to preventjeopardy of the fish. 9
The biological need for an environmental water account may not
become obvious until a water project has been in operation for many
years, the biological need becomes critical, and conflict becomes
intense.
Intense conflict in California helped agencies and
stakeholders alike recognize the risks of long-term conflict and
promoted greater creativity when resolving more than the immediate
dispute.
Intense regulatory conflict saps financial, natural and
emotional resources, without improving the environmental conditions

in May. When May pumping exceeded take limits slightly, the ESA Agencies did not
call for any additional pumping reductions.
36. Determination of Threatened Status for the Delta Smelt, 58 Fed. Reg. 12,854
(Mar. 5, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Listing of the Sacramento River
Winter-run Chinook Salmon as Threatened, 55 Fed. Reg. 49,623 (Nov. 30, 1990) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
37. SWRCB Water Rights Order 90-5, supra note 6.
38. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 315-16
(2001).
39. See discussion infraPart II.E for a more complete description of ESA regulation.
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at the heart of the conflict. 4 Antagonists will pay their lawyers to go to
court, their lobbyists to the Capitol, and their chief executives to
regulatory agency executive suites. As the conflict continues, delayed
regulation may result, and environmental conditions may deteriorate
further, risking heightened restrictions on water use to save an
environment in a more dire condition. The listed fish in California
suffered from just such a delay. 41
Still, opportunity also arose from California's conflict. Although
California stakeholders and government agencies had been litigating
the Delta's water quality standards for fishery needs for more than a
decade, the ESA listings brought the water conflict into sharper focus
and helped frame the debate over how to restore the ecosystem. The
disputing stakeholders paid not only for lawyers, but also for a broad
array of biologists from agencies who contributed to a better
understanding of the biological needs of the listed fish. The debate
among biologists led to identification of remedies that did not require
water, such as habitat restoration.4 ' The conflict turned agency and
stakeholder attention to restoration of the ecosystem. If the ESA
Agencies had not listed salmon and delta smelt, the conflict would not
have reached crisis proportions. Without the crisis, stakeholders
would not have invested in the research identifying watershed-specific
needs of the listed fish; attention would never have turned to the
recovery of these species.
An environmental water account offers flexible tools to achieve
recovery, provided its managers have access to dedicated biological
research and monitoring. Each listed species' lifecycle will lead to
different kinds of water needs at different times of the year or in
different types of hydrologies. Defining these needs requires careful
The importance of investing in research cannot be
research.
overstated, as each scientific conclusion, particularly by regulatory
agencies, will be carefully analyzed and often challenged by
stakeholder scientists. In California, the conflict led agricultural,
urban and environmental stakeholders to hire scientists to review the
At times of particular
biological conclusions of the ESA agencies.4
40. As a Metropolitan Water District ("MWD") director, I participated in that
conflict. The MWD Board created the Delta Political Advisory Committee in order to
address the ongoing legal and political conflict over the Delta's waters.
41. Seven years after a California court rejected the 1978 Delta water quality
control plan and D-1485 in 1986, the SWRCB still had not adopted new Delta water
quality standards and withdrew its new draft Delta water quality control plan. While
the water quality standard debate continued, new fishery conflicts at the pumps arose

and the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a jeopardy opinion for water project
operations later that same year. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at
315-16.
42. Although NMFS biologists had advocated spawning habitat restoration, water
user biologists touted these non-water projects as the answer for listed salmon. A key

part of the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord was funding for habitat restoration. See BAY-DELTA
ACCORD, supra note 14.
43. When the ESA Agencies presented their 1993 biological opinions at a public
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frustration, some stakeholder agency managers would denigrate the
biological opinions and decisions as emanating from "third-level
biologists."" At the point that agencies and stakeholders invest in
creating an environmental water account, no doubt about the
biological need for environmental water can exist. The biological
need must be clear to achieve cooperation, win the necessary
commitments, and successfully implement the environmental water
account.
Conflicts over environmental water needs continue to rage across
the West, but should be recognized for the opportunities they may
present. The California conflict of the early 1990s showed that conflict
provides the opportunity for a shift in the water supply/use paradigm.
Instead of focusing only on defending existing urban and agricultural
water supplies, antagonists should recognize the larger need for
healing the conflict and resulting damage to the watershed's
ecosystem. Without healing, the conflict will only make those water
supplies less reliable, risking a downward spiral of environmental
damage and increasing regulatory requirements. Recognition of that
risk, which can only arise out of intense conflict, sets the cornerstone
for building an environmental water account that can lead to
ecosystem healing.
B. THE REGULATORY BASELINE
Clearly establishing a regulatory baseline, against which use of
environmental water will be measured is critical to success. Achieving
a consensus baseline, however, is not easy. Creating a baseline
requires three steps: (1) establish the historical facts of water demands
and environmental conditions; (2) determine baseline conditions that
would best stabilize the fishery; and (3) draft precise regulatory
requirements for that baseline."
With those pieces in place,
structuring the environmental water account can begin.
The most hotly debated issue in any environmental water conflict
is the "cost" of changing water project operations for
environmental/fishery needs. Measuring that cost requires a baseline
against which to compare new operations. In the early stages of the
California conflict, each stakeholder measured these costs against the
baseline that favored its particular interests. As a result, stakeholders
battled over baselines.
They argued over alternative legal
meeting, stakeholder scientists attended and analyzed each statement in the biological
opinions at the meeting.
44. During the early years of the California conflict, I represented the city of Los
Angeles on the Board of Directors of the MWD, a major participant in the Delta
conflict. I heard the "third-level biologist" phrase on several occasions during the
1992-94 period when SWP pumping was reduced.
45. California achieved this baseline when the agencies and stakeholders adopted
the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord. The parties were fortunate to have more than seventy
years of hydrologic data and fifty years of fishery data. See discussion supra Part I.A.
46. As the Environmental Water Account concept began to germinate, Secretary
Babbitt urged stakeholders to put aside their "baseline theologies."
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interpretations of regulatory baselines as well as differing theoretical
baselines of current water demands. 47 The stakeholders then debated
fish had a right to use based on the different
how much water the
"existing" baselines.48 In a world of conflicting and shifting baselines,
it is impossible to calculate precisely what losses water users actually
suffer from water project operational adjustments for fish, thus the
conflict continues.
The CALFED EWA would not have taken shape without the
regulatory baseline established by the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord. The
Accord was achieved at the end of the state's worst drought, when
stakeholders could see the risks of long-term conflict in the next
drought if the environmental problems were not resolved. The
stakeholders and agencies therefore conceded to significant water
project operations changes and agreed to a regulatory baseline.
With the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord baseline in place, California then
turned its attention to improving environmental conditions and
avoiding a future debacle during which listed species populations
could drop precipitously, risking jeopardy and causing substantial
curtailment of project pumping. The stakeholders and agencies
focused on addressing those occasional crises that arise even with a
regulatory baseline, as occurred in 1997 and 1999. The intent of the
CALFED EWA was, in part, to address such unpredictable events. 4 9 If,

however, the parties were still at war over basic environmental
protections, then the EWA would have had little opportunity to
succeed because its resources would have been needed to maintain the
regulatory baseline.
Without a clear and agreed upon baseline of environmental
protection and water demands, accounting for an environmental water
account may become impossible. The baseline is the necessary starting
As
point at which to begin building environmental assets.
47. See, e.g., BAY-DELTA Accord, supra note 14 (establishing a thirty day spring
period where pumping could not exceed the inflow from the San Joaquin River (i.e.
one-to-one standard)). The subsequent 1995 biological opinion for delta smelt,
however, indicated that smelt needed pumping to be no more than half of San
Joaquin River inflow (i.e. the two-to-one standard). Less pumping means a higher risk
of reduced project water deliveries. In addition, the projects had agreed to meet that
standard pursuant to an agreement with San Joaquin River water right holders and a
subsequent SWRCB order. During the final EWA negotiations, SWP contractors
argued successfully that the SWP should abide only by the Accord's "baseline" one-toone standard. Some environmentalists argued that the SWP had already agreed to
abide by the two-to-one standard. The EWA now compensates the SWP for the
difference between the two standards.
48. Interview with Michael Thabault (Nov. 11, 2001). In California in 1993, for
example, storage facilities downstream from the Delta were virtually full, and there was
not much agricultural water demand because the soil was still moist in late spring
when NMFS called for reduced pumping in response to excessive take of salmon. The
State Water Project operators asserted that late-spring pumping reductions were not
part of the regulatory baseline, and the reductions therefore caused substantial water
losses, even though there was no where to put the water.

49. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 54; EWA Op. Prins., supra note 32, at 1.
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environmental water assets are contributed, they may be needed just to
stabilize the ecosystem, to keep moving toward that baseline. The
debate will rage as to allocation of all water resources in the watershed,
as well as how to measure the water used for the environment. When
does the environmental water account incur charges? When do the
account's assets grow? When the watershed enjoys a high precipitation
year and instream flows are substantial, does the account get charged
for the additional instream flows? How much is the charge? By
establishing the baseline of protection and water project operations
(or water use) in various types of hydrological conditions, the
environmental water account operators can begin accounting for
growth and declines in the account's assets based on changes from
baseline conditions.
The regulatory baseline also can provide a different kind of water
asset that an environmental water account does not effectively provide:
the minimum conditions that the fishery requires in every type of
hydrological year. The drafters designed the CALFED EWA to
respond to changes in hydrology or fishery needs. The basis for its
initial moderate size was an estimate of fishery needs beyond the
regulatory baseline, so the listed fish could move toward recovery.0 In
contrast, regulatory requirements provide for the minimum needs of
listed species that are consistent year in and year out. If the EWA were
required to provide the baseline of regulatory protection, the water
costs would deplete the EWA's assets in many years, and preclude the
flexible responses necessary for improving fishery conditions and
moving toward recovery.
The California experience shows that
creating a strong foundation for an environmental water account starts
with setting the baseline.
C. FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION
Dominant federal regulation of endangered species and water
quality, combined with state control of water rights, make federal-state
cooperation an important element of a successful environmental water
program. Each government can contribute particular legal authority,
expertise, and experience. If one level tries to direct policy alone, it
faces roadblocks to success, which only the other government can
remove. By working together, the federal and state governments can
avoid such barriers and engage a much broader array of contributions
to an environmental water account's success.
The federal and state governments each play important roles in
managing the West's water resources. Congress has passed a number
of federal laws related to water, from sweeping regulatory laws5' to

50. CALFED Bay-Delta Program, CALFED EWA Fishery Needs 3 (Dec. 21, 1999)
(Staff Draft) (on file with author).
51. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. Sub. Ch. XII (1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
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water project authorizations and appropriations."2
The federal
government, however, has deferred the regulation of water rights to
the states 3 and delegates to them key regulatory functions under the
Clean Water Act.5 4 Both levels of government typically share in the
expense of a water project development, such as the CALFED BayDelta Program."'
The state and federal roles in developing an
environmental water account therefore remain an important element
in an environmental water account's success.
California generally has taken aggressive steps to store, manage
and protect water resources and the aquatic environment. Governors
have often staked their place in history on their water resource
activities, from Pat Brown's building of the State Water Project to Gray
Davis' prominent role in establishing the CALFED Bay-Delta Program
in concert with Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt.6 The
California Legislature also has assumed leadership in drafting statutes
that promote effective use of limited water resources." Finally, not to
be left out of the equation, the California Supreme Court has
recognized the Public Trust Doctrine 8 and confirmed a broad role for
state agencies that regulate water.59 The state's many innovative
approaches to water policy allowed it to play a leading role in the
CALFED EWA development.
However, when California tried to set its own course in water policy
without federal participation, stakeholders and government agencies
alike recognized the necessary and valuable role the federal
government must play if resolution of key water issues is to be
achieved. A state court had rejected the SWRCB's 1978 Delta water
quality standards in 1986." Five years later, the federal EPA formally
rejected those same state standards and encouraged the state to
develop new standards.6 ' The following year, Governor Wilson set out
the state's water policy for the Delta and appointed both a stakeholder
advisory group ("Bay-Delta Oversight Council" or "BDOC") and a
52. See, e.g., Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1994); MARK REISNER,
CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMEIcAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986).
53.
54.

See California v. Arizona, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
SeeFederal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).

55. See S. REP. No. 107-39 (2001); CALFED

BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT

2000, at 49-51 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://www.calfed.water.ca.gov.
56. See generally ARTHUR L. LrlLEWORTH & ERic L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER
(1995); CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, CALIFORNIA'S WATER FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ACTION (2000) [hereinafter FRAMEWORKFORACTION].
57. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725-1745 (West 2002).
58. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied
sub noma., Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
59. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 202 (1986),
cert. denied, Supreme Ct. Minute 09-18-1986.
60. Id. at 196.
61. Press Release, EPA, (Sept. 3, 1991) (on file with author).
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working group of his water agency leaders ("California Water Policy
Council") .62 Neither group included federal representatives. 6 After
the SWRCB proposed a new set of aggressive Delta water quality
standards, Governor Wilson urged his own SWRCB to scrap the
proposal in 1993." During this same period, the SWP suffered Delta
pumping reductions arising out of both federal and state ESA
consultations. 65 The governor's state-only groups failed to end the
conflicts in the Delta. Certain stakeholders withdrew from BDOC, and
environmental groups pursued their suit against the EPA to impose
federal Delta water quality standards. 66 Recognizing the need to work
with the federal government, the governor's Water Policy Council
agreed to cooperate with federal agencies to resolve Delta issues. The
Accord followed six months later."
California learned an important lesson about water policy
development in the West: the federal government must participate
with the states in the ultimate resolution of water resource conflicts.
The coordination of state and federal government activities promotes
broader participation in an environmental water program, and greater
success in achieving common environmental and water resource goals.
In addition, an environmental water account will benefit from
cooperation with local governments (particularly counties) and
stakeholders. Local cooperation in establishing an environmental
water account will ensure ready sources of water assets and operational
creativity in applying those assets. Where water conflicts develop, the
watershed's water resources are generally completely allocated, or even
over-allocated. When environmental water needs become apparent,
the conflict over reallocating those resources ensues. The only way to
resolve that conflict with an environmental water account is to engage
local water right holders and users in taking action that allows water to
go to environmental purposes. Those actions range from water
transfers to conservation to shifting to the use of groundwater
aquifers. 68 A successful account will rely on every option to build its
account of available water assets. The diversity and abundance of
those assets depends on broad-based cooperation and creativity among
federal, state and local authorities.
62. GOVERNOR'S WATER POLICY PRINCIPLES (on file with author).
63. See Memorandum from John Amodio, Executive Officer, Bay-Delta Oversight
Council, to Council Members (June 20, 1994) (on file with author).
64. See Press Release, EPA, U.S. EPA Reaches Settlement With Sierra Club on
Bay/Delta Suit, (Sept. 17, 1993) [hereinafter EPA Press Release] (on file with author).
65. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 315-16

(2001).
66. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. Browner, No. 93-646-LKK (E.D. Cal. 1993) (on
file with author). See EPA Press Release, supra note 64.
67. Compare FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, supra note 13, and BAY-DELTA AccoRD, supra
note 14.
68. The Department of the Interior, for example, is currently considering water
acquisitions to provide instream flows in two tributaries to the Sacramento RiverButte Creek and Mill Creek. Both of those acquisitions depend on cooperation with
local water right holders.
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D. FUNDING
Creation of an environmental water account does not come cheap,
particularly in fully appropriated watersheds where the competition
for limited water resources is intense. The need for such an account is
nevertheless the greatest in these watersheds. The West's established
and emerging urban centers increasingly rely on water from distant
watersheds.
The entrance of an urban water supplier into an
agricultural watershed drives up the value of water resources,
particularly as the urban area grows and its water demands expand.69
When the need arises to restore water to the environment, all those
who rely on the watershed's resources will share the cost. Creators of
an environmental water account will confront the substantial
challenge of equitably allocating the account's financial costs among
all of the existing users.
After extensive debate regarding the distribution of the CALFED
EWA's costs and benefits, California chose to seek annual
appropriations to fund the EWA. On one hand, many in the
environmental community suggested that the water projects'
contractors pay for the CALFED EWA because when EWA operations
reduced deliveries, the water users benefited most from the EWA's
reimbursement of water to the projects. The CALFED Bay-Delta
Program considered seeking legislation to require those who divert
water from the Delta to pay a use fee, which might fund the EWA.7"
The SWRCB's draft Decision 1630 also considered imposing Delta user
fees.7' On the other hand, water users argued that an environmental
program benefits the broader public, and therefore taxpayers should
fund the program. Alternatively, there were proposals to divide the
EWA's water assets among the needs to aid species recovery, to comply
with biological opinions, and to avoid jeopardy.2 Some water users
suggested they would be willing to pay for biological opinion
compliance, but not recovery. Whenever anyone suggested that the
CALFED EWA might help comply with the Delta water quality
standards, the EPA refused to support public funding for such
compliance.
The EWA negotiators therefore sought annual
appropriations from taxes without specifying whether it was a recovery
or compliance tool.7"

69. When MWD began seeking water acquisitions throughout the Central Valley in
the early 1990s, many water right holders refused to "sell out" to Los Angeles, and
those few project water users who were interested proposed prices significantly higher
than they had paid for the water.
70. See FRAMEwoRK FOR AcION, supra note 56.
71. State Water Resources Control Board, Draft Decision 1630 (1992).
72. An attorney for the State Water Contractors, Clifford Shultz, proposed this
concept during a 2000 meeting with the agency leaders developing the EWA.
73. See FRAMEwoRx FOR AcnoN, supra note 56.
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E. STRUCTURE

Determining the most effective institutional structure for
administering an environmental water account will depend on the
nature and expertise of the institutions involved in the particular
watershed. The analysis starts with the federal, state and local agencies
that either operate or regulate water storage or conveyance facilities.
Next, the non-governmental stakeholders, including organizations and
individuals, who have committed the time and resources, may get
involved in environmental water issues within the watershed. Finally,
the elected officials who care about these issues will substantially
influence the implementation of the account. Analysis of these actors'
institutional authority over water use within the watershed is the
foundation for structuring the institution responsible for the
environmental water account.
The scope of existing agencies' legal authority will determine how
best to structure the environmental water account's administration.
For a federal agency to play a substantial role in the account's
operations, it must have statutory authority to acquire and use water to
support the fishery or other environmental needs." State and local
agencies that seek an institutional role will need to consider how the
operation of an environmental water account will complement or
compete with their existing programs and responsibilities.
Options for the governance of an environmental water account
may include placement of the account within an existing federal, state
or local agency; creation of a new governmental organization under
elected or appointed official(s); or the appointment of a non-profit
organization as an environmental account steward. In watersheds with
a history of intense conflict, agencies and stakeholders often do not
trust each other.
Each participant in the structuring of an
environmental water account, therefore, will seek support for, and
perhaps bias toward, its interests. Whether it seeks representation on a
governing board or direct authority over the environmental water
account's operations, each participant seeks a governing structure that
reflects its perspective on the problem the environmental water
account addresses. Determining how best to structure institutional
control over an environmental water account offers the opportunity
for the many agencies and stakeholders to disclose their interests and
achieve consensus on the critical challenges of the watershed and how
the environmental water account should address those challenges.
The state and federal entities responsible for operating the Delta
waterways and regulating the needs of listed species in the Delta
agreed to cooperatively implement the CALFED EWA and assume
responsibility for EWA management." The CALFED EWA negotiators
divided responsibility for implementing the EWA between the water
74. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1994); Central
Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706.
75. EWA Op. Prins., supra note 32, at 1.
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project agencies (Bureau of Reclamation and the California
Department of Water Resources) and the fisher , agencies (FWS,
NMFS and California Department of Fish and Game).76 The water
project agencies ("project agencies" or "PAs") took responsibility for
acquiring the environmental water, while the fishery agencies
("management
agencies" or "MAs") managed the use of the EWA
77
assets.

Engaging existing regulatory and operational agencies in the
administration of an environmental water account ensures their
continued interest, involvement and commitment to its success.
Ultimate success, however, depends on achieving broad stakeholder
support of an environmental water account. That support provides
the necessary cooperation and funding for the environmental water
account and allows account operators the discretion and flexibility
necessary to use the environmental water account's assets effectively.
An alliance of government agencies is best equipped to operate an
environmental water account because government agencies frequently
must balance the type of diverse interests that collide in the operation
of an environmental water account.
Closely related to the institutional structure is the legal structure
for establishing the environmental water account and building its
assets. California considered a wide range of options for legal
protections of the EWA assets and, ultimately, chose a mix of assets
and the protections for those assets. In initial CALFED EWA
discussions, the legal structures ranged from water rights to water
project contracts for an environmental steward." In the end, because
the project agencies and management agencies were so integral to the
EWA operations, those agencies chose agreements or water project
contracts as the key legal tool for the EWA. Those contracts range
from water acquisitions to project operations agreements.79
The CALFED EWA's assets and their corresponding legal
protections are by no means exhaustive of all possibilities.8" Water
rights are one type of asset that is notable for its absence in the EWA's
initial endowment. However, because the EWA focuses its resources
on resolving conflicts at the Delta export pumps, operational
agreements with the project agencies gave the EWA an asset that has
greater influence over control of the pumps-access to excess project
storage or conveyance capacity.8

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
See 6/99 PHASE II REPORT, supra note 22, at 96-97.
See EWA Op. Prins., supra note 32.
Id..
Id.
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F. REGULATORy AssURANCES: "THE COMMITMENTS"
Water users support the CALFED EWA because it offers the hope
that their water supplies will be more reliable and stable. They gained
this confidence from the "ESA Commitments" s2 and the U. S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, which
indicated that the water projects will have " ... no reductions, beyond
existing regulatory levels, in CVP or SWP Delta exports resulting from
measures to protect fish under FESA and CESA."' The ESA provides
the legal framework for such regulatory assurances. When an ESA
Agency lists a fish species as threatened or endangered, it gains various
protections."' Among these, two important legal protections stand out.
First, ESA section 9 makes it unlawful to take listed species. 5 Second,
ESA section 7(a) (2) requires each federal agency to "insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species.

,,

The ESA allows take under certain conditions. ESA section 7
allows the ESA Agencies to issue, after consultation, a biological
opinion with an "incidental take statement" concluding that such take
does not jeopardize the species. 7 Exceeding the limits of the
incidental take statement generally requires that the federal agency
reinitiate consultation with the ESA Agencies, which, in turn, may lead
to other changes in the terms of the biological opinion. ESA section
10 authorizes the ESA Agencies to permit some take as part of an
otherwise lawful activity by non-federal entities that propose and
implement a Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP"). Such non-federal
actors who receive section 10 permits can also receive "No Surprises"
assurances, which assure that they will not have to take any other
conservation actions beyond the HCP's requirements.88 While federal
agencies may not receive the same "No Surprises" assurances under
section 7, the ESA Agencies may craft biological opinions that set the
consultation requirements and other provisions high enough to
provide some assurance to the federal agency and its permittees.
Due to the close coordination between the federal CVP and
California's SWP,89 the SWP participated in the CVP's consultation
with the ESA Agencies pursuant to ESA section 7 with respect to Delta
export pumping.
As a result, "No Surprises" assurances were
82. CALFED ROD, supranote 2, at 57.
83. Id
84. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
85. Id. § 1538; see also Endangered Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.21 (1999).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2).
87. Id.§ 1536(b).
88. Id. § 1539; see also 50 C.F.R § 17.22 (1999); 50 C.F.R. § 17.32 (1999); 50 C.F.R. §
222.22 (1998) ("No Surprises" regulations).
89. Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-546, 100 Stat. 3050.
90. Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Ecological Services, Sacramento Field
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unavailable to either the federal or state projects. At one point,
certain contractors reportedly approached members of Congress
inquiring whether California might obtain unique statutory protection
similar to "No Surprises" assurances for both state and federal water
contractors in conjunction with the CALFED Bay-Delta Program.
Those inquiries, however, did not result in statutory changes."
To avoid confusion with section 10 "No Surprises Assurances," the
ESA Agencies and the project agencies ultimately provided
"commitments" within the Record of Decision, the CALFED biological
opinion, and the EWA Operating Principles Agreement.
The
commitments applied to the export parties, relying on the export
pumps where the CALFED EWA would be most effective. The basis
for the commitments is three tiers of protection for listed species: the
first tier is the regulatory baseline, the second tier is the EWA, and the
third tier "is based upon the commitment and ability of CALFED
Agencies to make additional water available should it be needed."93
The additional third tier depends on the water projects' ability to
acquire water or, if absolutely necessary, draw on other project
supplies. It fulfills the section 7 responsibility of the federal agencies
to avoid jeopardy and ensures that listed species are not at risk.
While "No Surprises" assurances enjoy a more established
regulatory structure, the Bureau of Reclamation's participation in
most western watersheds suggests that the California commitments
may apply more readily to watershed-wide environmental water
accounts. The scope of the account, its intended effects, and the
assurances sought will dictate how best to provide assurance to water
users. If the account is only for a tributary watershed and assurances
are sought only for non-federal diversions, then section 10 provides
the strongest assurances. However, if the account covers an entire
watershed, then federal diversions are more likely involved. At that
point, the commitments provided in the CALFED Program still
provide assurances to water users, only on a more limited basis.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Establishing an environmental water account only begins the
challenge of managing the environment's water assets.
The
environmental water account is a tool for more effective water
management. It will not resolve all environmental water conflicts, but
it will provide a framework for responding to the environmental water
needs that lead to conflict. It can therefore minimize or shorten those
Office, to Regional Director, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Sacramento, California
(Mar. 6, 1995) (on file with author).
91. Reports of this lobbying effort reached the author in 1999 and were confirmed
in an interview with Tim Quinn. Interview with Tim Quinn, Vice-President,
Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Jan. 9, 2002).
92. See generally CALFED ROD, supra note 2.
93. CALFED ROD, supra note 2, at 54-58.
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conflicts. At the same time, the account's operation may lead to new
debates about how to manage environmental water supply. New
debate may promote greater dialogue about water use priorities, needs
for improved water infrastructure and management, and the water's
value within the watershed. Successful resolution of this dialogue
depends upon continued cooperation, creativity and flexibility in
responding to nature's hydrological and biological challenges. To
operate water facilities more precisely, and enlarge and carefully
manage the account's assets, all agencies and stakeholders in the
watershed need to work closely.
In 2001, California completed one year of CALFED EWA
operation. The EWA worked, albeit not to the complete satisfaction of
every stakeholder. Questions existed about the ESA Agencies' choices,
namely, applying a substantial portion of the CALFED EWA assets to
salmon protection in the winter, early in the water year.94 As the
CALFED EWA proceeds, the watershed's stakeholders must move past
their contentious history and allow trust and confidence to grow as the
EWA operators learn how to effectively use the CALFED EWA assets
and operate the EWA within its water "budget."
A. BUILDING THE ASSETS
Circumstances surrounding the creation of the CALFED EWA
shape its growth opportunities. The CALFED EWA gained assets in its
first year, and it now enjoys access to more assets through defined
processes, particularly project reoperation and water acquisitions.
Successful development of a broad range of EWA assets, however,
requires varied skills and processes, including legislation, contract
negotiation, water right change applications, new storage and
conveyance facility construction, and water project operational
modeling. For most of these activities, the federal agencies need to
complete an environmental analysis pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 9- while state agencies complete
parallel analysis pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act.
CALFED EWA operators have already faced perhaps the most difficult,
on-going challenge: obtaining annual state and federal appropriations.
During the first year, the EWA relied exclusively on state funding
because Congress could not agree on CALFED authorization or
appropriation legislation. 96
The most significant challenge in building the CALFED EWA's
assets will be reoperating the state and federal water projects to take
94. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2001) (on file with
author); EWA REvIEw PANEL, FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL WATER
CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM (2001), available at
FOR THE
AccOUNT
http://www.calfed.water.ca.gov; THE BAY INsTITUTE, THE FIRST ANNUAL STATE OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL WATER AccouNT REPORT

(2001) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT] (on file

with author).
95. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370e (1994)
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55.

96. See 2000
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advantage of excess project storage or conveyance capacity for the
EWA's benefit.
Successful reoperation depends upon close
cooperation between biologists and engineers. The EWA operators,
including both the ESA Agencies and the water project agencies, will
need to operate two large water storage and conveyance facility
networks with smaller margins for error. Only through such precise
water project operation will the relationship improve between water
project operators and ESA Agency biologists. Not only will state
project operators and biologists join the relationship, but also all EWA
operators will acquire new skills. Engineers will learn more about
listed fish species' sensitivities. Biologists will learn more about
minimizing water project yield costs. All will need to learn how to
develop the EWA through project reoperation, taking advantage of
periods when the projects have minimal effect on fish and project yield
can grow. This deepening relationship between the ESA Agencies and
the Project Agencies offers one of the most important, yet unstated,
benefits from the EWA's development.
CALFED EWA water acquisitions may assume many forms, from
water rights acquisitions, to physical water conveyance agreements, to
waiver of contractual rights, to water deliveries. Determining the most
effective water acquisitions depends on the watershed's resources:
where water is available, where environmental water is needed, and
where account operations necessitate water replacement. Answering
these questions demands a broad dialogue among agencies and
stakeholders throughout the watershed. Acquisition targets may arise
from unexpected sources.
A range of other issues will also influence the CALFED EWA
operators' water acquisition choices. First, California's water law
regime affects the acquisitions because of how the law allows water
transfers, 97 protects water for instream uses,"9 and regulates other water
project development in the watershed.'
Second, other water
management and ecosystem restoration projects' progress may affect
water availability or fishery water needs. South-of-Delta storage
facilities (both underground and surface), for example, may expand
the availability of CALFED EWA storage options when the EWA has
access to pumping capacity and needs asset storage facilities. Finally,
CALFED EWA operators may receive "water deals," which are offers
benefiting both EWA and the offeror. The EWA operators have
already considered agreements to reoperate other projects' facilities,
to shift water demands to groundwater and to finance groundwater

97.
98.
99.
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storage development."' The challenge facing CALFED EWA operators
will be selecting among the many acquisition options and judging their
value to the EWA as well as to broader water management goals.
B. ACCOUNTING/MEASUREMENT

From early in the California conflict, the parties debated how to
account for water dedicated to the environment. The accounting
debate arose as each stakeholder group compared each operational
change to its favored baseline and thus, affected its interest. The water
users, particularly project contractors, argued, and continue to assert
today, that the environment was taking their water rights every time
export pumping was reduced to protect listed species.'0 '
Environmentalists argued that the projects had no right to destroy the
0
environment and take listed species into their pumps."
They also
argued that the environment was not to blame for stopping such
diversions.
The accounting debate's primary focus arose out of Congress' CVP
"yield" allocation to certain environmental purposes pursuant to
CVPIA Section 3406(b)(2). The "(b)(2)" debate has persisted for
most of the last decade.0 3 Initially, the Department of the Interior
("Interior") did not account for the use of each acre-foot of so-called
"(b) (2) waters." Instead, Interior modeled the CVP yield impacts for
various environmental actions in different hydrological years and
committed water to those actions, allowing for the fluctuating water
amounts required for such actions.
In addition, Interior had
committed CVP yield from (b) (2) for the federal share of complying
with the 1994 Accord.0 4 A 1997 legal challenge resulted in a federal
court order for Interior to adopt an accounting system,' 5 which the
court then reviewed and generally accepted.'
The (b) (2) accounting
system provided a foundation for the EWA's accounting system
100.
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because it focused on effects on water project deliveries.
The California accounting debate led to many general questions
concerning proper accounting methods, such as:
. Should the basis for accounting be hydrologic water use
modeling or actual measured application of water?
* Should the CALFED EWA suffer a charge for every reservoir
release, even when diverted for consumptive uses downstream?
. Should the CALFED EWA suffer a charge for every pumping
reduction, even when there is no reduction in deliveries?
. Should a CALFED EWA charge occur only when water project
deliveries drop?
. Should a CALFED EWA charge occur for every diversion
reduction, even when the water remains in an upstream reservoir?
While there may be many ways to approach the accounting, two
broad categories become apparent: accounting for water released and
dedicated to environmental benefits, and tracking losses to established
water users.
While the (b) (2) accounting principles generally applied to the
CALFED EWA, its operators continue to develop its precise accounting
rules, as the EWA Operating Principles Agreement requires.' 7 That
agreement grounded EWA accounting generally on effects on
deliveries to state and federal water project contractors. Although
there has not been any legal challenge to EWA accounting at this
point, this accounting will continue to challenge the operators.
In assessing the best accounting method for an environmental
water account in a particular watershed, start with the nature of the
conflict from which the environmental water account proposal arises.
The conflict often begins when environmental demands lead to
reduced deliveries for consumptive uses. In that case, accounting
based on the effect of account operations on those deliveries may
provide the best gauge of its success. Charges would occur only when
the account is required to compensate for lost deliveries, not for
modifying project operations when no delivery reductions occur. As
for accounting for deposits, account operators will need to assess the
nature of each water acquisition or reoperation to determine how
much the account benefits. At times, such accounting may require a
modeling comparison between existing conditions and the changes
As with so many
arising out of the acquisition/reoperation.
environmental water account issues, the best accounting method will
depend on the watershed.
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C. COORDINATION WITH OTHER PROGRAMS/GOALS

As Californians have learned, building an environmental water
account can benefit both environmentalist and traditional water user
interests. It can bind together those two historically warring factions.
In addition to drawing the factions into a closer working relationship,
an account's operations may support other projects that require
mutual support. An environmental water account gives all sides
incentives to ensure there is a sufficient water supply for all needs,
including agricultural, urban and environmental. However, achieving
these benefits requires coordination between the environmental water
account and the other programs that serve the needs of each
stakeholder group. Other programs may include water storage
development, particularly groundwater aquifer/conjunctive use
projects, multiple use projects, including recycling, and affiliated
ecosystem restoration projects.
1. Conjunctive-Use Groundwater Storage.
In analyzing how best to build the CALFED EWA assets, the EWA
agencies learned that long-term storage of EWA water assets could
provide the most reliable environmental supply in wet or dry years.' 8
Developing the EWA, therefore, fostered support for new storage,
particularly projects that would not cause additional substantial
environmental damage. In addition to expanding existing reservoirs
to meet both water supply and fishery needs, the agencies committed
to expanding groundwater storage used in conjunction with existing
surface storage reservoirs.
Active management of groundwater
aquifers in the southern part of California's Central Valley provided a
model for how to enhance water supply reliability for consumptive
uses.n° The CALFED EWA began pursuin such groundwater storage
opportunities in its first year of operation.
2. Multiple Use/Multiple Objectives.
Operation of an environmental water account can create benefits
for other water demands, particularly water quality and water supply.
Instream uses may improve water quality by dilution or pushing
saltwater out of the river's estuary and back toward the ocean, as is
possible in California's Delta. Instream uses also may promote natural
streams as a means of conveyance to downstream consumptive uses.
An account's central benefit to water supply is the certainty or
108. This conclusion arose out of the extensive modeling completed during the
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reliability. An account can act as a limitation on environmental
demands for water and therefore enhance water supply reliability.
Finally, an account may provide a reliable demand for reclaimed water
from upstream consumptive users. In each case, the key is multiple
uses of the same valuable water resource.
While the creators of an environmental water account can set lofty
goals of fulfilling a variety of needs, such goals can create risk of
missing the primary goal of restoring an ecosystem. Setting several
goals for an environmental water account may create conflicts among
competing demands for the account's assets, leading to conflicts
among account operators as to water priorities. Such debates may
recreate the conflicts from which the account developed and impede
resolution of conflicts between environmental and consumptive use
demands. The challenge for the creators and the operators of an
environmental water account is to balance the many separate
environmental needs with each other and with the watershed's
established consumptive uses.
California chose a middle course in establishing the CALFED
EWA. It set the needs of listed species as the first priority, without
trying to resolve water quality concerns with the same supply. At the
same time, however, the EWA creators committed to no degradation
of water quality arising from the EWA's operation, compared to
historical pre-EWA conditions. The CALFED EWA takes one more
step in focusing use of its assets to address fishery needs in the vicinity
of the state and federal project export pumping facilities in the
southern part of the Delta, but allows for instream uses upstream from
the pumps."'
A key factor in the success or failure of an environmental water
account is the scope of its objectives. Defining scope requires a
difficult balancing: too broad a scope will make achievement of
multiple, contradictory objectives nearly impossible; too narrow a
scope will allow achievement, but possibly at the cost of other closely
related environmental improvements. Ultimately, focusing on a
narrow set of goals while allowing account operators to use available
assets to achieve other related environmental goals might provide the
best option. Flexibility allows an appropriate response on those
occasions when a comparatively small amount of water may contribute
substantially to valuable, related ecosystem improvement.
3. Other Environmental Programs.
Linking an environmental water account to other ecosystem
restoration programs can improve both programs. Other non-water
ecosystem improvements may ultimately reduce the need for applying
additional water to create fishery habitat. Promoting other local
environmental water programs also may contribute to reduced
112.
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demand for account water downstream within the same watershed.
Coordinating diverse ecosystem restoration projects may be difficult,
but often advantageous to both environmental and competing
consumptive demands.
The ESA's determined focus on single-species recovery can hinder
broader ecosystem recovery for multiple species.
When an
environmental water account is to resolve ESA-generated conflicts, it
may respond to a particular species. Close coordination of the
account's operations with other environmental programs that promote
a diverse ecosystem recovery can provide synergistic benefits for all.
Both listed and unlisted species benefit from a healthier ecosystem.
D. DECISIONS
While the creators of an environmental water account deserve
credit for making many difficult decisions as to the nature of the
account, other difficult decisions remain. Making an environmental
water account work demands constant analysis and deliberation about
how to make the most effective use of limited environmental water
resources. Courageous people must make these critical decisions and
face the ensuing debate as to the propriety of those choices.
If agency leaders or stakeholders assume this responsibility,
account operators need clear authority to operate the account in an
effective and timely manner. The purpose of an environmental
account is to respond quickly to sudden or developing ecosystem
changes that can threaten valuable fishery resources. Those who must
react quickly need the authority to change those dangerous conditions
immediately, whether the change requires releasing water from
reservoirs or reducing diversions. The decision-makers must be able to
respond with the confidence that affected water users will be able to
recover water from the account's water assets.
Freedom and authority to make such decisions requires
unequivocal objectives for operation of the environmental water
account. The account cannot afford to have decisions clouded by any
hint of conflict of interest on the part of the decision-makers. Account
operators' first priority must necessarily be ecosystem protection and
restoration. A successful operation must be free from contradictory
demands, such as simultaneously improving water supply or drinking
water quality. Too often, agencies face conflicting legislative direction
to accomplish many purposes. The Supreme Court has said that
government officials, by definition, cannot have conflicts of interest
despite contradictory legislative direction. In those situations, the
officials must weigh those contradictory directions and seek balance of
competing objectives.113 While the legislative branch may seek to satisfy
a variety of interests, success of the account will suffer.
California achieved this clarity by dividing responsibilities between
the fishery agencies and the water project agencies. The fishery
113.
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agencies ("Management Agencies") enjoy the luxury of making only
the bioloical decisions of where to use the CALFED EWA's limited
resources. . The water project agencies ("Project Agencies") hold the
responsibility for acquiring the necessary water assets and operating
the projects as necessary for the CALFED EWA."' Other agencies and
stakeholders still have an oversight role in the CALFED EWA
operation, but at the end of the year or when the assets have been
exhausted and listed species still face jeopardy in the continued
operation of the water project export facilities. 1 6 The CALFED EWA
operators therefore do not face day-to-day interference or challenges
to their decisions in times of crisis. In this way, the role of each group
of CALFED EWA participants remains distinct.
1. Setting Priorities Throughout the Watershed.
The first task of environmental water account operators is setting
priorities for acquisitions and for development and application of the
account's assets. In a world of limited financial and water resources,
identifying the account's priorities will allow the account operations
staff to work on the most important projects first. Acquiring water will
require time and funding to complete environmental analysis pursuant
117
to NEPA or similar state requirements.
Identifying the most
important environmental needs will allow operators to choose the
most valuable assets to respond to those particular needs. As the
environmental water account begins operation, biological conclusions
may change and lead to shifting biological priorities. When the
biological priorities change, the nature of the necessary assets shifts as
well. The ability to respond to these changing conditions is one of the
most valuable benefits of implementing an environmental water
account. An environmental water account allows flexibility that fixed
regulation cannot offer.
California was fortunate in that it was required to start developing
recovery priorities before the conception of the CALFED EWA. While
the biologists were studying the needs of the listed fishery species to
avoid jeopardy, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA")
set the ambitious objective of doubling anadromous fish (mostly
salmon) populations within ten years." 8 By imposing restoration fees
on water deliveries and authorizing water purchases for fishery needs,
the CVPIA provided funding, authority and mandates to move beyond
jeopardy avoidance."9 Funding, limited by the amount of CVP water
114. EWA Op. Prins., supra note 32, at 1.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., FiRsTREPORT, supra note 94, at 29.
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sold to contractors, obligated both the Bureau of Reclamation and the
Fish and Wildlife Service to engage in determining the biological and
funding priorities for the Central Valley.
Setting priorities must take precedence in the early development
and implementation of an environmental water account. While fishery
agencies have a statutory duty to study fishery needs and to use the
best available science,' stakeholders can still play a role in developing
those restoration priorities. A broad-based debate about the account's
recovery priorities will help ensure that the ecosystem requirements of
the entire watershed will receive the attention they need, and that the
account's priorities are not so narrow as to consider only the recovery
of listed species.
V. CONCLUSION
California's experience creating and operating an environmental
water account reflects the Central Valley watershed's unique
characteristics. The conflict of the early 1990s arose out of a unique
estuary ecosystem and its use as a conveyance system for California
water projects. The CALFED EWA addresses the watershed's unique
biological and hydrological conditions, which are constantly changing.
The EWA's success depends on how well its structure works despite
those constantly changing conditions. Success requires continued
cooperation and creativity among the agencies and stakeholders that
work within the Central Valley watershed.
Those from other watersheds nevertheless may learn from
California's lessons during the past decade. That knowledge may
come from making choices based on their watershed's specific needs.
The most important lessons, however, come from the process that
California has implemented. It is possible to distill those process
lessons into three principles:
Recognize the opportunity conflict can create.
Conflict
promotes careful analysis and exposes the long-term risk of failure to
resolve the environmental problems within the watershed.
Cooperate and coordinate openly. The EWA depends on
federal and state water projects to provide reliable deliveries to water
users and for instream flows for fish. Attaining those sometimescompeting goals is possible only if all interested parties work together.
When the ESA Agencies and the water project operators work together
in public view, stakeholder trust and confidence in agency decisions
can grow.
Build consensus on priorities.
Continued conflict over
fundamental priorities for the watershed's future impairs the ability to
work together on any common program, particularly an
environmental water account. Combatants must find common ground
if they hope to resolve the conflict and move forward. While
consensus is a common objective in western watersheds today, it is
120. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (2000).
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difficult to achieve. By building trust and enhancing common
knowledge, the agencies and stakeholders can at least find consensus
on the fundamental priorities for moving ahead.

